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Abstract This paper deals with a methodology of computer modeling and simulation of mar-
ket competitive situations using game theory. The situations are thematically focused mostly
to models of commodity markets but the applications of the methodology can be wider. This
methodology covers the whole modeling work, including a primary speciﬁcation of a problem,
making an abstract model, making a simulation model, design of a state space of the problem
and the simulator itself. As a whole, the methodology represents a complete framework for im-
plementation of computer models of commodity markets suitable for their further analysis and
prediction of their future evolution. The main contribution of the paper consists in the algorith-
mic implementation of computer processing of large strategic game.
Keywords Market models, non-cooperative game theory, modeling and simulation, artiﬁcial
intelligence
JEL classiﬁcation C51, C53, C63, C72 ∗
1. Introduction
Game theory is traditionally considered to be a discipline of pure mathematicians and
mathematically oriented economists. The literature on game theory is quite large and
includes various (analytical) models of elementary situations. These models describe
every-day decision problems of people playing games, traders doing their business,
politicians in elections and others. But the scale factor of quality and advisability of
every theory is expressed by its real applications arising from real requirements. In
this point, the literature is not so rich and practical case studies can be found mostly in
commercial papers advertising a particular analysis tool.
Research connected to this paper was motivated by colleagues from EG´ U Brno
company. They are experts in analyzing and predicting the electricity markets which
they do using their own computer models. In the recent years, we created a package
of interconnected computer models covering the electricity markets in the region of
Central Europe (Hrub´ y and Toufar 2006). Our models include several aspects of the
electricity market commodities, behavior of the producers, consumers and the overall
legislation. Although the architecture of the mentioned models might be of interest
of the readers, their detail description would exceed the size of a journal paper. For
that reason, this particular paper focuses mostly to the mathematical and modeling
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fundamentals of our models. It deals with methods of applying the game theoretical
principles in computer science. From the computer science point of view, we work on
artiﬁcial intelligence in the computer modeling. The main contribution of the paper is
supposed to be in the presented methodology of designing the computer models and
in the algorithms of their simulation. It might be an inspiration for those who like to
implement the game theory in practical computer models. Anyway, as the world of
electricity is very close to our thinking, we will recall the terminology of the electricity
markets to demonstrate the described ideas in suitable moments.
Computer modeling and simulation together with artiﬁcial intelligence are both tra-
ditional areas of computer science. Model of a system A is usually deﬁned as another
system B which is somehow similar to A. By saying modeling we mean a process of
expressing the model in form of some modeling formalism (programming or simula-
tion language, for example). System B is always a simpliﬁed version of the system A,
it contains just a part of its elements and their internal relations. We usually do not
know the whole structure of the system A, we are not capable to cover the system A in
its whole complexity or the system A is not realizable in our physical world.
The computer simulation is a process of doing experiments with the model. We
gain a new knowledge of A during experimenting with its representation by system B.
The term simulation is also understood as an execution of a simulation model (when
speaking about models in programming languages). During the experimental phase,
we have to conﬁrm that B system is really similar to A. We validate the model, or
debug or calibrate the model.
Both the game theory and computer science deals with the modeling of systemsand
their further analysis through the models. But there is a signiﬁcant difference in doing
that: the mathematical approach usually chosen by game theorists is called the analy-
tical modeling, the computer approach is called the simulation or computer modeling
(numerical). The analytical model in form of mathematical equations is a perfect con-
ception of the studied system. We input the parameters to the equations and obtain the
results immediately. The computer model must be put into a deep and time consuming
experimenting. Moreover, as a numerical solution, it gives only approximate results.
The experimenter has to keep in his mind, that he works with an imperfect and incom-
plete model, and the results are always infected by a certain error corresponding to the
time spent in experimenting.
The analytical modeling seems to be the best way of doing the models. However, it
is almost impossible to construct an analytical model of a larger system. It is practical
to model the problems in analytical manner just in cases of very fundamental problems
or in cases of some elementary parts of larger problems. For the rest of the tasks, it
is highly recommended to build a computer model and to endure a time consuming
experimentations. Modern computers already allow that.
The computer representation of a model always discretizes the studied problem.
No matter if it is a meteorological model of atmosphere or a game-theoretical model
of a decision problem, its domain (naturally continuous) is transferred to a ﬁnite enu-
meration – to a ﬁnite set. The cardinality of the discrete domain implies the number
of computing operation necessary to proceed in the model execution. The computer
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approach to model design is useful also for other reasons. The power of computers
substitutes a human intellect spent in the analytical modeling. Contemplation of a
mathematician can be transferred to a quanta of computing operations done by the
machine.
The computer modeling has evident advantages in the ﬁeld of modeling of com-
plex systems, e.g. game situations. But we have to face some theoretical and practical
computing constraints – the memory constraints and the time constraints. They both
come from the algorithmic principle of the machine processing – searching the state
(strategy) space. We have to keep in mind that every operation of the machine takes
some time to be processed. The whole simulation may take hours, days or even years.
Methods of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) based on searching the state space use so called
heuristics. The heuristics is an expert knowledge helping the AI algorithm to predict
(observing the passed computation) what sub-spaces of the state space are not recom-
mended for the further searching. Unfortunately, the heuristics are very connected with
the particular model and they are not re-usable, they make the model over-complicated
and decrease its ﬂexibility.
We look for some universal heuristics which is not integrated in the application
model. This approach should arise from some general game-theoretical law or a prin-
ciple. Such a mechanism shall not require the modeler to inﬂuence his model with
some application-speciﬁc heuristics. Such a mechanism shall experiment with an ap-
plication model to ﬁnd a faster way towards its solution.
We are going to introduce a framework suitable for development of such automa-
tized mechanism and two examples of these mechanisms. It should be emphasized that
the methods and algorithms described here were developed during many years of de-
velopment of computer models of electro-energy markets. Case studies made by these
models are requested by the government and commercial institutions in this sphere of
industry.
The paper is organized as follows: the section 2 introduces and explains the ba-
sic assumptions and terms used in the paper. The section mentions a speciﬁc internal
model cellModel evaluating the members of game state space. Let us imagine the
cellModel as a procedure written is some programming imperative language. The
cellModel takes the majority of the processor time and the whole methodology at-
tempts to ﬁnd a such algorithms which minimize the count of its invocations. The
section 3 brings a more formal description of the game state space and its meaning
in game-theoretical modeling. In the 4th section, the abstract architecture of a game
model is presented. Its abstract parts will be concretized in sections 5 and 6, where an
example of an equilibrium solver and example of a state space reduction mechanism
are deposed. The last section 7 concludes the paper.
2. The modeling methodology
In market games, competitive situations are subject of modeling, in order to be able to
better understand the behavior of the players in the real life or to be able to predict the
behavior of real players (producers, traders and consumers). Theoretical literature on
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gaming shows sometimes a certain measure of skepticism about whether the game the-
ory can be successfully used for the prediction of future (a very interesting experiment
is described in Green (2002)); in other cases, the usefulness of the game theory for
predictions is defended (Erev et al. 2002). The game theory is undoubtedly a relatively
successful and usable method. A number of papers (Krause et al. 2004, Yiqun et al.
2002, Gountis and Bakirtzis 2004, Kwang-Ho and Baldrick 2003) demonstrate that in
the area of the electricity markets modeling (which is of interest of the author), mostly
use the analytic models developing certain game-theoretical principles.
In this section, we introduce an approach of modeling the competitive situations.
The whole methodology is heading towards a computer model able to predict the future
evolution of the modeled systems.
We are specialized particularly in markets with centralized trading where all con-
tracts are signed in the same time or the decision must remain constant for a certain
time period (year). These situations are then modeled as strategic games – games in
normal form (Myerson 2004). Let us ﬁrst deﬁne a game in strategic form and some
basic important terms.
Deﬁnition 1. A game in strategic form of N players is deﬁned as:
G = (Q;S1,S2,...,SN;U1,U2,...,UN),
where
(i) Q = {1,2,...,N} is a (ﬁnite) set of the players.
(ii) Si,i ∈ Q are ﬁnite sets of (pure) strategies of players i. Product of strategy sets
makes the game state space S = S1 ×S2 ×...×SN. Members of state space are
called strategic proﬁles s=(s1,s2,...,sN). Let S−i denote similarly a subspace of
S without Si. S−i notation will be frequently used to express a context of the i-th
player’s decision situation. Finally, s−i = (s1,...,si−1,si+1,...,sN) is a member
of S−i.
(iii) Ui : S → R,i ∈ Q are utility functions assigning a payoff to each player i in each
proﬁle s ∈ S. We shall not delve too deeply into the analysis of the form of
player’s payoff; the payoff will simply be a number (often expressing player’s ﬁ-
nancial proﬁt). We expect the utility function not to be deﬁned for some proﬁles.
In that cases, utility function assigns some game neutral payoff (zero or a nega-
tive value). The utility functions Ui are usually implemented as N−dimensional
arrays indexed by strategy proﬁles s ∈ S.
In some parts it will be preferred to denote shortly G = (Q;S;U) to describe a game
G with a state space S and utility functions U. We may write that the state space is
computed to emphasize that the utility functions are known for all s ∈ S.
Modeling of games should lead to some equilibrium points. The strategic proﬁle
s∗ ∈S consisting of the actions s∗
i made by individual players will be referred as a game
solution. We expect the players to choose the best response on their opponent’s possi-
ble action. The equilibrium is the mutually best response, which is formally deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 2.
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Deﬁnition 2. Strategic proﬁle s∗ is the equilibrium in the game G, if:






We have mentioned a need of some automatized mechanism that would experiment
with the model to speed-up the classical searching in state space. The mechanism is
supposed to reduce automatically the game state space following some general game-
theoretical principle. The algorithms described here are based on examination of do-
minant and dominated strategies. Let us formulate the classical deﬁnition of the domi-
nance.
Deﬁnition 3. Let us have a strategic form game G = (Q;S;U). Strategy si
1 of a player
i strictly dominates strategy si
2, if




1 of a player i weakly dominates strategy si
2, if
∃s−i ∈ S−i :Ui(si
1,s−i) >Ui(si
2,s−i)∧∀s−i ∈ S−i :Ui(si
1,s−i) ≥Ui(si
2,s−i)
The strategy dominance is connected to a technique called iterative elimination of do-
minated strategies which reduces the game state space. This technique is not trivial
in the time-complexity point of view. On the other hand, we may handle the strategy
dominance from the characteristics of the Best-response. The Best-response characte-
ristics studies the player’s behavior in situation when his opponents play strategies in
sub-proﬁle s−i.
Deﬁnition 4. Strategies Si
best ⊆ Si of a player i are his best-response in the strategy
context s−i ∈ S−i, if:
∀sb ∈ Si
best,∀s ∈ Si,s 6= sb :Ui(sb,s−i) >Ui(s,s−i)
Set of Best-response strategies of the player i in the context s−i ∈ S−i will be denoted
as BRi(s−i), or simply BRi(s); BRi(s−i,G) to emphasize the particular game G. Let us





Obviously, if ∀s1,s2 ∈ Si : Ui(s1,s−i) = Ui(s2,s−i) holds for some s−i ∈ S−i, the
best-response is equal to Si. We will consider this state to be not suitable for the game
analysis. It is preferable to work with such games, where ∀s−i ∈S−i :|BRi(s−i)|￿|Si|.
Anyway, it is ideal if |BRi(s−i)| = 1.
With the framework of strategy dominance, these statements can be considered:
(i) A rational player never plays a strategy, which is (strictly or weakly) dominated
by another strategy (see G-solve in section 5.4).
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(ii) A rational player always plays a strategy from BRi(s−i) in the sub-proﬁle s−i.
The fact of |BRi(s−i)| > 1 introduces a certain uncertainty and hence a mixed
behavior.
(iii) A player always decides within the set SBR,i. The strategies Si \SBR,i have no
meaning for him. We are going to call them simply the dominated strategies.
The strategies SBR,i will be called the dominant strategies.
Distinguishing the dominant and the dominated is the starting point for proxessing
the game tasks. Splitting the strategies to dominant and dominated is not evident di-
rectly from the G game speciﬁcation. To analyze the dominance, the algorithm must
go through the whole state space. This is impossible in many practical cases for the
complexity reasons (see section 2.3). In this paper, we are going to demonstrate that
it is realizable to analyze a relevant sub-part of the G state space to compute the best-
response characteristics of the players. Concentrating only to SBR,i strategies (as a
minimal representative of the original G) the computer can ﬁnd the game solution of G
without analyzing the whole state space.
2.2 Strategic equivalence of games
Strategic equivalence of games (Myerson 2004) is a wider term. We introduce a spe-
ciﬁc deﬁnition of the term relevant for this paper.
Deﬁnition 5. A game Gr = (Q;Sr;Ur) is strategically equivalent to another game G =
(Q;S;U), if holds:
(i) Sr ⊆ S and
(ii) ∀sr ∈ Sr,∀i ∈ Q :Ur,i(sr) =Ui(sr) and





This means that a game Gr is strategically equivalent to G if it is played in the same
set of players, just the state space Sr is a subset of S and no strategically important
(dominant) strategies are omitted.
The task is to ﬁnd a strategically equivalent game Gr for a given game G using an
efﬁcient algorithm, i.e. using an algorithm with better time and memory complexity
than the method of iterative elimination of dominated strategies (or its equivalent in
the meaning of best-response characteristics). More reasoning for that is given in the
following section.
2.3 Algorithmic complexity of the game analysis
The time and memory algorithmic complexity is the essential problem in area of these
models. We are not going to study rigorously a complexity of the algorithms, nei-
ther from the point of view of game theory nor from computer science point of view.
This particular research is connected to the real existing models. The algorithms and
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methods are developed to allow their user to proceed his practical experiments in rea-
sonable time using the available computer machines. Thus, we simply differentiate
between the good and bad complexity. We keep in mind the words of Kamal Jain:
“If your PC cannot ﬁnd it, then neither can the market.” As the market can ﬁnd it, we
have to make a model which ﬁnds it as well. This sort of disproportion between the
complexity of the reality and its model is common for all AI algorithms.
The time complexity of an algorithm is given by number of computing operations
necessary for computing the response for a given input. In the area of real computers,
this is the time we have to wait for the result.
The memory (space) complexity is given by number of memory cells necessary
to ﬁnish the computation for a given input. The real computers are limited by their
physical operation memory. In the game theoretical models speciﬁcally, we are often
limited by the fact that the whole N-dimensional matrix of utility functions U can not
be present in the computer memory.
Which one of these two complexity problems is the one stopping us to complete the
task? Practically, we do not care about the time complexity of the analytical algorithm
solving for example the strategy dominance. Mostly, we have to care about the input
game state space which does not ﬁt the computer memory. Let us demonstrate that on
the following example.
Example of the algorithmic complexity
Let us assume a rather simple algorithm (Algorithm 1), which computes the Best-
response characteristics for a given player i and a given context s−i. The Algorithm 1
terminates with a set of BRi(s−i) strategies.
Algorithm 1 Best-response algorithm
Input: sub-proﬁle s−i, player i
max := -MAXIMUM NUMBER
list := []
for si in Si:
u := Ui(si,s−i); Comment: If Ui(s) is not known, it must be computed by
cellModel(s) ﬁrst – this is the main computational load in the whole algorithm.
if (u=max):
add si to list
else:
if (u>max):
list := [si]; max := u
return list;
Now, let us consider a 8-player game where each player has 100 strategies, so
Q = {1,2,...,8} and |Si| = 100 ∀i ∈ Q. The size of the whole state space is |S| =
1008 = 1016 cells. Each cell s ∈ S keeps an utility (U1(s),U2(s),...,U8(s)) – a vector
of eight numbers. Let a number takes 4 bytes of computer memory, so the cell of eight
utilities takes 32 bytes in total.
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Computing SBR,i in (1) using Algorithm 1 requires the utility function Ui to be
known for all s ∈ S. At ﬁrst, let us assume that the whole Ui(s) is stored in the com-
puter memory. Then, it requires 1016 ·32 bytes of memory which is 32·1016 bytes,
or approximately 32·107 Gigabytes (GB) of RAM memory (the current PC computers
have usually 1-8GBRAM).This whole eight-dimensional matrixof eight-dimensional
vectors clearly can not be stored in memory of any existing computer.
Secondly, let us assume that Ui(s) is not stored in memory, but there is a function
(a computer procedure) computing the i-th player’s utility for any s ∈ S (this computer
procedure will be called cellModel in this paper). Such a function is computed in a
physically existing computer and it takes certain time – let us say 1ms = 10−6s (using
a standard PC processor doing approximately 500 million ﬂoating-point operations per
second). The computer thus can compute one million requests for the utility function
cellModeli(s) per second. We will use the transcriptionU(s) to highlight that the value
of the utility for s is known and the transcription cellModel(s) (or cellModeli(s)) to
emphasize the need to compute (as a computer program) the value ﬁrst.
Let us recall the Algorithm 1. Computing BRi(s−i) for a given i ∈ Q and s−i ∈
S−i requires the cellModeli(s) function to be invoked |Si| times (i.e. 100 times in our
example). ThereissurelysomecomputingoverheadintheAlgorithm1it-selvesbutwe
neglect it. To compute all SBR,i for all i∈Q we need to invoke cellModeli(s) [Pi∈Q|Si|·
|S−i|] = |Q|·|S| = 8·1016 times. Doing one million iterations of cellModeli(s) per
second, we need 8·1016·10−6 seconds to get know all SBR,i, which means about 2500
years.
We can see, that the game-theoretical algorithms analyzing the games work only in
cases of very small games.
2.4 Designing a game-theoretical numerical model
The game theory usually regards G (see an example in Figure 1) according to the De-
ﬁnition 1 as the problem speciﬁcation (i.e. including the assignment Ui). The game
theory is then a package of analytic tools helping us to ﬁnd the solution out of the set
of players, their strategies and the numerical analysis of their payoffs (Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994).




In this paper, we deal with modeling of problems implementing the game theory
and its algorithmization (so called algorithmic game theory Nisan et al. (2007)). The
speciﬁcation of G is not regarded as an input for our deliberations but rather as an
interim result of our computations. Searching for the ﬁnal prediction in form of the
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equilibrium is just a ﬁnal step of the long process which passes through the following
phases (i)-(vi). First ideas of this methodology were published in Hrub´ y and Toufar
(2006).
(i) Speciﬁcation of an abstract model of the situation – the main objective of the
model and its known and unknown parts must be speciﬁed. In the case of market
models, we specify the purpose of the model, the market commodities under the
study, time range of the forecasting and others.
(ii) Identiﬁcation of players and their mutual relations – mapping of real institu-
tions (e.g. producers and buyers) to strategic game players is speciﬁed. This is
followed by the modeling of their economic potential, their knowledge of the
system and key features of their strategic behavior (ideal competition, oligopoly,
leader-follower,...). For example, all regional traders with electricity are ag-
gregated to a single national buyer. Let us note that at the level of a large
international-scale business operation (as e.g. long-term contracts for the deli-
very of electricity) we assume complete information about the game among the
players (game structure including utility functions is common knowledge to all
players).
(iii) Game rules determination and selection of the type of strategic equilibria – in
the sense of the game theory we differentiate between two basic game classes:
strategic and sequential. In most cases, our games are strategic (games in strate-
gic form, normal-form games, matrix games). There are variants of equilibria
including Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951), Stackelberg equilibrium (Latorre and
Granville 2003), correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, Papadimitriou 2005)
and others. The games also contain nested (inner) strategic sub-decisions in
form of nested games or auctions (Krishna 2002).
(iv) Model of the game strategy and strategy generation – we work with numeri-
cal models and, therefore, with a certain degree of discretization of unknowns.
Moreover, in real game situations, we introduce various forms of hierarchical
decision-making with multi-dimensional strategies. For example, let us consider
the decision of a producer to supply his product to various national markets
(geographically) or to allocate his production capability to different particular
products. In the electricity case, we differentiate between various time-deﬁned
commodities (year base supply, monthly base supply, peak-load,...) or system
reserves. The producer decides about to sell his production to his domestic cus-
tomers or to export it abroad.
(v) Game payoff determination model – this part represents the expert core of the
whole issue. The objective is to design and to implement the model of the situa-
tion speciﬁed by the given strategic proﬁle. To put it in other words, we are de-
veloping an application-speciﬁc function cellModel(s,C). This function returns
the players’ utility vector for the given proﬁle s ∈ S and the global game context
C. It is a modeling and computational implementation of functions Ui : S → R.
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There is a signiﬁcant difference between the utility functions U and the func-
tion cellModel. From the Computer science point of view, Ui is a mathematical
function returning the player’s payoff instantly (in zero time); Ui is a memory
record, an array indexed by strategy proﬁles s ∈ S. On the other hand, this in-
formation must be computed ﬁrst (by the cellModel), this computing load takes
some processor time and makes the simulation experiment time consuming. Re-
sulting value of cellModel is then stored inU. A similar approach was published
in Viguier et al. (2006). The whole state space is computed in the loop as it is
shown in Algorithm 2. Time complexity of this computation may be very high,
as the upper border of the complexity is deﬁned by the number of iterations |S|
and by the complexity of cellModel. Indeed, we do try to establish theoretical
principles which will allow a reduction of the computational load (Hrub´ y and
ˇ Cambala 2008). That is the sense of this paper.
(vi) Theoretical analysis of the game and the determination of the equilibrium – once
all information describing the game according to the deﬁnition G is complete (all
Ui are computed), we need to algorithmically determine the rational behavior
of players within the game. The result of the game is thus the proﬁle s∗ ∈ S,
which we compute (according to the particular equilibrium concept) as the most
probable strategic decision of players participating in the game. This phase is
enormously demanding computationally too. The complexity can be reduced
by the analysis of the state space and by the elimination of strategies, which a
rationally thinking player would not be likely to play.
It should be emphasized very strongly, that the so called internal model cellModel
computing the payoff vector for each strategy proﬁle s ∈ S is not just a simple function
revenues−costs. The cellModel for certain s ∈ S is supposed to be a rather com-
plex model of what all happen in the real life if players i ∈ Q adopt their strategies
si. Regarding the particular application, cellModel may model their strategic offer to
various markets, their behavior in inner sub-decision making, their bids in auctions and
their production model. If we say revenues−costs, some mechanism must compute
the level of the revenues and some other mechanism must specify the costs. In our
particular case, computing the costs is very complex as it requires an optimization of
the production process. For example, in the models with one-hour time granularity,
the cellModel procedure computes an optimization of working point of all included
power plants (linear programming task) for 8760 hours of the year. This explains
why cellModel can not be expressed analytically as a mathematical function but im-
plemented as a numerical model and the whole application model works in discrete
strategies.
Example of a numerical model
Successive phases of the game-theoretical modeling can be best shown in a ﬁctitious
oligopoly example. Let us start from a situation involving a group of N players, where
each player i is fully deﬁned by his production machines Mi = {mi
1,mi
2,...}. Operation
of the machines is simpliﬁed to these three parameters:
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(i) ﬁxc: M → R ; ﬁxed costs of the machine which must by paid no matter if the
machine produces or not (it is mostly an amortization of the machine).
(ii) prodc: M → R ; production costs per unit of production (e.g. coal, gas,...).
(iii) cap: M → R ; production capacity of the machine in number of units.
The demand for the (single) commodity is considered to be invariably demand
(which is a usual situation at energy markets). In terms of the oligopoly price gaming
we ask a question: What are the price and volume of production that individual players
will successfully achieve at the market? We assume that players know each others
production parameters. The game is regarded as a strategic form game, i.e. all players
i∈Q choose their strategies s∗
i concurrently, at the same time, and the result of the total
selected proﬁle s∗ = (s∗
1,s∗
2,...,s∗
N) are payoffs Ui(s∗). As for the equilibrium concept,
Nash equilibrium is selected. In this manner we pass phases (i)-(iii).
Furthermore, we have to specify sets of strategies Si of individual players and sub-
sequently to design the game internal model cellModel computing payoffs Ui(s) in
proﬁles s ∈ S. We treat the game as a discrete system, and, therefore, we also would
like to have discrete sets of strategies. The searched quantity, i.e. commodity price,
is expected to be in the interval p = hpf,pti (pf,pt ∈ R). When modeling a real
commodity market, we indeed expect that the resulting price will lie in a certain rea-
sonable range and, therefore, the ﬁniteness of p is acceptable. The price range can
be converted to a discrete form in an arbitrary manner, e.g. in the form of a regular
series Prices = pf,pf +step,pf +2·step,...,pt. We may set Si = Prices for all play-
ers i ∈ Q; generally, however, sets of players’ strategies can differ for each individual
player. The main problem in this approach consists in the correct determination of the
discretization step step which also deﬁnes the precision of the prediction model. The
correct construction of the set of strategies is a separate expert problem which will be
analyzed later on.
The determination of Si yields the state space S = S1 ×S2 ×...×SN. In order to
evaluate the payoff of players in the game, we have to invoke a certain internal model
cellModel(s,C) for all s ∈ S and a certain global context. In our case, the context is
given by C = {demand}. The cellModel((s1,s2,...,sN),C) is a procedure computing
what offers are the players going to make at si price, how they will succeed in the
competitionandwhatproﬁttheycanmakeintheproﬁles(seeHrub´ yandToufar(2006)
formoredetails). ThefollowingprocedurecellModel(s,C)modelswhathappeninone
strategic proﬁle s ∈ S. The cellModel procedure is a sequence of the offer, trading and
production settlement.
Let us say that every player i offers the production capacity of those machines that
are proﬁtable in the context of his price strategy si; s ∈ S:
M
p
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required by the player i and amounti is the number of units of the modeled commodity.
The buyer wants to buy demand units of the commodity (we assume no price-demand
elasticity). Let Bids is a list of bids ordered by price (supply curve).
By trading, we mean a transformation of the list Bids to a similar list Sells =
{(i,selli,si),..} of amounts selli accepted by the buyer from each producer i for price
si. In the proﬁle s, if totalOffer(s)≤ demand, all bids are accepted, so selli = amounti
for all i ∈ Q. Otherwise, the buyer buys up to demand units respecting the offered
price.
The producer receives the information about the contract made (amount selli sold
for si price). He arrange his production set to produce selli for optimal cost – let
Yi(selli) is a optimizing procedure spreading the selli load over his set of machines Mi.







profiti(selli,si) = selli·si−optimalProductionCost(selli)− å
m∈Mi
ﬁxc(m)
To complete the procedure, the cellModel(s,C) is a sequence of steps:
(i) Collect bids from all players.
(ii) Intersect the supply curve with the demand and generate messages selli to the
players.
(iii) Players optimize their production units regarding the accepted amounts selli and
enumerate their outcome
profiti(selli,si).
(iv) cellModel(s,C) := (profit1,profit2,...,profitN)
This cellModel(s,C) is invoked for all s∈S (see Algorithm 2). After |S| iterations,
all information of the game is evaluated, and we can proceed toward the analysis of the
game to determine the expected forecast – the equilibrium. Implementing the model
would be trivial for anyone. We just wanted to demonstrate the functionality of the so
called internal model computing the payoff of all players i ∈ Q acting in the s strategic
proﬁle and the global context C – cellModel(s,C).
Let us remind the heuristics and the preference. Can the player i generally know
whether he makes better (selling more for a higher price) when playing si
1 rather than
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2 in the context s−i? Can the heuristics during computation of cellModel((si
1,s−i),C)
easily predict the player’s contract in the proﬁle (si
2,s−i)? No, the player (all players)
must try that invoking cellModel for both proﬁles. All attempts to implement heuris-
tics into cellModel which, having a knowledge of the value of cellModel(s1), shall
predict the next outcome in s2 proﬁle will fail. Moreover, such a functionality makes
the cellModel procedure more complicated and restrain to the further modiﬁcation of
the internal model. For this reason, we look for an automatized heuristics which does
not need to see inside the internal model.
2.5 The status of game equilibrium
The equilibrium is understood to be a rule, or a model specifying a probable behavior
of players in the game context – it means, within the strategies and known payoff func-
tions. In our models, we strictly assume that the utility functions and other parameters
are common knowledge. This paper also shows that when using our methodology,
choosing a particular equilibrium concept is just a ﬁnal computing operation over the
game state space.
The time and space complexity is very important for the construction of these mo-
dels and computing the equilibrium in the simulation experiments. We differentiate
between the equilibrium algorithms where we expect or do not expect the U to be
computed:
– The U is expected to be computed. We just analyze the computed state space to
ﬁnd the equilibrium points (traditional algorithms computing Nash equilibrium).
– TheU isnotexpectedtobecomputed. Thealgorithmstartsfromzeroknowledge
of U and touches (cellModel) just that cells which the algorithm needs for its
operation. PuttingthecellModel computationandtheequilibriumdetermination
together may decrease the number of accessed cells from S (in compare to the
previous concept). This may decrease the computing time to a fraction of the
conventional approach (G-solve).
2.6 Two-level approach to modeling of game situations
Anefﬁcientcomputerimplementationofgamemodelwastheopeningideaforthetwo-
level model architecture. The efﬁciency means the computing efﬁciency mainly. The
software engineering is the second view to the efﬁciency. We also require the model
(as a software work) to be easy to understand and ﬂexible for future modiﬁcations.
The traditional AI algorithms work with the state space, evaluate its cells in form of
some utility and search for the optimum (methods of searching in the state space, prob-
lems solving, playing games). All these methods employ various forms of heuristics to
decrease the computing complexity. The heuristics are pieces of programs containing a
particular expert knowledge of the problem to be solved. They help the AI algorithm to
predict that parts of the state space which are useless for the analysis and redundant for
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the search of the optimum. From the modeling (software engineering) point of view,
the heuristics are parts of the model badly inﬂuencing its clarity and ﬂexibility.1
There is a compromise and rather good solution: computing of the utility of each
particular cell (cellModel) is separated from the mechanism searching in the state
space. We say that the mechanism searching in the state space experiments with the
model cellModelG of a given game G. The basic mechanism is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Basic search in state space
for s in S:
U[s] = cellModel(s,C)
eq = determineEquilibriumPoint(S,U)
The Algorithm 2 goes through the whole state space and enumerates U(s) for all
s ∈ S. The time complexity of Algorithm 2 is given by the cardinality of S and the
programming implementation of cellModel. The computing complexity of cellModel
is not trivial as the cellModel may contain other sub-decisions (inner games), produc-
tion optimization and so on. Moreover, we do not expect that the whole contents of S
can ﬁt the computer memory. The Algorithm 2 is thus just a theoretical demonstra-
tion. Its time and memory complexity makes the theoretical upper boundary of the
state space computation. It is the worst solution and we attempt to ﬁnd the better ones.
An algorithm verifying that a given proﬁle s∗ is or is not the equilibrium, is the lower
boundary.
We expect that the mechanism processes the state space of G in such a way which is
efﬁcient from the point of view the particular game, and type of the chosen equilibria
concept. The algorithm searching the state space of G shall terminate (output) with:
(i) A minimized game Gr = (Q;Sr;Ur) without dominated strategies (Si \ SBR,i)
which is strategically equivalent to G. The equilibrium of G is then computed us-
ing some other procedure (for example using some already implemented solver
like GAMBIT (Gambit homepage 2008).
(ii) Solution of G in form of a game equilibrium s∗ (analyzed using G or Gr).
Wearegoingtopresenttwodifferentapproachesinthispaper. Theﬁrstonedemon-
strates an efﬁcient computing of the equilibria (the correlated equilibrium (Aumann
1974) in our case). The second one searches the state space in extremely huge games
to reduce the given game into its strategically equivalent version without dominated
strategies. Both methods are based on analysis of strategy dominance.
1 There are some other very efﬁcient methods of dynamic reduction of strategy sets. However, they exceed
the topic of this paper.
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3. State space of the strategic games
We model the decision processes. An intelligent entity is supposed to make a decision
and therefore, it analyzes its options. A strategy is taken in this context as a possibility
to act somehow. The entity thus collects all its options and starts to evaluate them. We
know, that in the strategic games, the entity evaluates the strategies in context of other
players.
We follow the model design and experimenter’s point of view. It is then necessary
to include this important fact: Construction of a representative and reasonable strategy
sets is an inseparable phase of the model design. The artiﬁcial intelligence yet has not
advanced so far that the AI algorithms would be able to pass that by their own. To
put it in other words, we do not expect the AI algorithm (or the prediction model as a
whole) to specify itself a task. Speciﬁcation of the task is still left on the experimenter
(user).
3.1 Generating the strategy sets
Let us assume that the model and all the computations will be held in discrete state
space. We may understand the modeled commodities to be continuous in their basic
principle (price, quantity). In the real life, we treat them as discrete anyway (elements
of currency (cents), production attributes of the machines, satisfying the quotas and
rules,...). We just have to specify the way of making these things discrete. The quan-
tities related to manufacturing are rather clear (production units, size of a package and
so on). The meaning of commodity price is the only trouble.
The continuous interval P = hpf,pti, within the price decision is expected, can
be easily discretized by a sampling period step. It makes a regular sequence Si =
{si,1,si,2,...} = sf,sf +step,...,st. The size of step is essential here. We lose an in-
formation value and sense of the model when a too long step (step is a big number)
is used. When having a too short step (a small number), one would assume that the
accuracy of the model gets increased (no matter if it increases the computational load).
However, the too short step just inﬂuence the model with a mixed behavior.
Let us have an example. The price of a commodity is expected to be withing
P = h0,10i. Setting the step = 1 makes the player distinguishing his optimal price s∗
i,x
(for example let s∗
i,x =7) very clearly. On the other hand, when operating at step=0.1,
after a signiﬁcantly longer computation, we achieve a probability distribution over the
pure strategies like 0.2·si,x−1,0.7·si,x,0.1·si,x+1 (price strategies 6.9,7,7.1). Can be
such a result accepted as the better solution? Does the model operating on step = 0.1
a better job than the model with step = 1? When doing predictions of the commodity
price in the far future (e.g. year 2025), does anybody believe the model to predict the
price with 0.1 precision?
3.2 Differentiation of strategies
We have described choosing of the right (reasonable) discretization step and its inﬂu-
ence to complexity of making the decision. A rational player must always be able to
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show (to satisfy the deﬁnition of the rationality) for any two his actions s1,s2, if s1 is
preferred to s2 or vice versa, or that both strategies are equal in their signiﬁcance. We
compare the strategies using their corresponding utility.









Similarly, we deﬁne that the strategies si
1,si
2 ∈ Si of a player i are distinguishable, if
∀s−i ∈ S−i :Ui(si
1,s−i) 6=Ui(si
2,s−i). (3)
Differentiation of strategies is useful for analysis of the game state space. It also
forbids the mixed behavior in the game. A player can clearly (purely) see his good and
bad strategies. We say that the strategy set Si of a player i is well distinguishable, if
the previous condition (3) holds for all si
1,si
2 ∈ Si. This condition is perhaps too strong
and very rare in the real world. Moreover, the dominance of strategies is never obvious
when the utility functions are not available (it is not directly clear that a player gains
more for price strategy e30 than for price strategy e25). Let us express the comple-
mentary view on the distinguishability in the form of the Best-response characteristics.
The state space is well distinguishable if
∀i ∈ Q,∀s−i ∈ S−i : |BRi(s−i)| = 1, (4)
or the number of best-response strategies for some sub-proﬁles remains small in com-
pare with the size of the strategy sets. Such a setting will not cause a state space ex-
plosion during the game analysis and the whole computation will remain in reasonable
response time.
Such a situation can be achieved if the cellModel model is designed with a special
care about enumerating the ﬁnal payoff in the proﬁles. Let us demonstrate the situation
using a game where the players choose their strategy in form of tuples (price,amount).
We will call that the multi-dimensional decision. Let us imagine a player who suc-
ceeded to sell the same amount sell when playing strategies si
1 = (price,amount1) and
si
2 = (price,amount2) in the same context s−i, but mainly amount2 > amount1. That
is an extension of the example in section 2.4. His payoff for the sold amount sell and
strategy (price,amount) is (the production costs are ignored):
Ui(si
j) = profiti(si
j,sell) = sell· price
The strategies si
1 and si
2 are indistinguishable as Ui(si
1) =Ui(si
2) holds. It is rather
evident that a real player would prefer the strategy si
1 because si
1 reserves a smaller
production capacity. If we include this reservation of the installed production capacity
to the equation on the side of production costs (r ∈ R+ is the cost of the capacity
reservation or lost income per unit), we achieve the wanted distinguishability:
Ui(si
j) = profiti(si
j,sell) = sell· price−amount ·r
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Let us conclude, that the situation whenUi(si
1,s−i)=Ui(si
2,s−i) expresses that both
strategies si
1 and si
2 are equally preferred by the player i. This state must have some
reason and motivation. It may become, that two different contracts (in their structure)
give the player an equal proﬁt, but this is very rare in our experience. It is mostly an
inability of a player to make a decision or an inability of a modeler to evaluate the
contracts properly.
3.3 Multi-dimensional strategies in decision making
In the preceding section, we brieﬂy introduced the modeling of multi-dimensional
decisions, i.e. a situation when a player makes a decision within the framework of
strategies generated in the form of Cartesian products of more quantities. In the previ-
ous example, the player has been choosing the strategies in form (price,amount). In
our decision models, the players make decisions composed from other sub-decisions.
Multi-dimensional decisions model the situations with more traded commodities or
more possible markets to make the contracts. The players have to decide about spread-
ing their production capacity to more commodities, they have to decide the price for
each particular commodity and the particular market to place it.
If the price is supposed to be within the interval Prices = hpf,pti and the amount
within Offer = h0,capi, then the strategy set of the player i is given by Si = Prices×
Offer (and discretized somehow again). We are not going to provide a complete
methodology of modeling multi-dimensional decisions composed of elementary sub-
decisions. More can be found in Hrub´ y (2007).
We know that the state space S of the game G is given by S = Pi∈QSi. The state
space represents an exhaustive listing of variants, that may occur in the game. Nash
(1951) proved that each ﬁnite game has at least one Nash equilibrium (generally in
mixed strategies). This means that, in any ﬁnite state space S, we may ﬁnd a stochastic
outcome s∗ ∈ S that will satisfy the deﬁnition of the Nash equilibrium. If S is the input
for the computational model, the model will always point to a solution. For that reason,
the design of Si is of key importance. A false speciﬁcation of the strategy of players
may tilt the result so that it departs from the real situation.
The composition of the strategy sets of individual players is scalable and thus well
suited for experimentation. If |S| = 1, then the solution is clear and there will be no
game at all. The classic game theory usually assumes that each player i has at least
two strategies so as to be the strategic player. In our concept, a player belongs to the
game as long as his impact is included in the internal model cellModel regardless of
the number of his strategies. Player i with Si = {si
1} is the participating player with
constant behavior si
1.
A similar situation arises in the pattern of multi-dimensional strategies. If the
player i is modeled in such a manner that he has a set of Di elementary decision-making
problems, where each elementary problem di
j ∈Di belongs to the ﬁnite non-empty list-
ing Dbase(di
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From the algorithmic point of view, the multi-dimensional strategy (a vector) is funda-
mentallyequaltoascalar-typestrategy. Thewholemethodologyoftwo-levelmodeling
and automatized mechanisms searching in the state space remains unchanged. Multi-
dimensionality of strategies just extends the size of strategy sets. But signiﬁcantly.
4. Implementing the model
The purpose of the modeling in this area is to design the parameters of a game follo-
wing the speciﬁcation in section 2.4, to identify particular decisions Di of players and
their domains Dbase(d),d ∈ Di (section 3.3). Proper designing of cellModel function
is an individual expert problem. It is rather important that the cellModel well differ-
entiates between the player’s strategies. This will minimize the mixed behavior in the
game which makes the computing unnecessarily more complicated (and the result is
not better in our opinion). The mixed behavior must have some reason in the game.
Having an unique pure equilibria is the preferable end of the analysis. Having just a
single equilibrium eliminates the need of further interpreting the results. Otherwise we
have to decide (algorithmically) what equilibrium is the most authentic as a behavior
of the players.
The described methodology shows a possible computer implementation in form
of a programming library. The application model can be then constructed from the
predeﬁned program elements. We develop a C++ library called GameLIB to support
rapid development of the application models. There is another example of a rather
general game library called GAMBIT (Gambit homepage 2008). The GAMBIT library
contains just the basic equilibrium algorithms and is not very suitable for this type of
modeling.
4.1 An example (MCE)
In one of our models – Model of Central Europe (MCE) – we model a strategic de-
cision of eight Central-European electricity producers in the region. They have to
negotiate year and month contracts of electricity delivery. We model all their power
stations and their detail operation including their time-variable production availability,
fuel consumption, interconnection to other industrial use etc. The decision on contracts
(amounts, prices) for the main yearly contract and twelve monthly contracts must be
done in one moment. The strategy (as one possible action of behavior) is thus a large
vector including many sub-decisions like: amount of yearly production to offer at the
domestic market, amount to export in yearly contracts, amount to reserve for monthly
contracts, required price for the commodity, and the same decisions for monthly con-
tracts. Moreover, the model includes another eight strategic buyers who decide how
to purchase their demand effectively (from the domestic producer or from the import,
their price-demand elasticity and the value added based on electricity consumption).
The state space S has then sixteen dimensions (eight producers and eight buy-





4,...) predestinates their behavior in the proﬁle s: the player-producer
i offers si
1 amount to its domestic market for si
4 price, si
2 offers to the export (which
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Figure 2. Basic composition of computation (Top view to the model)






requires an inner decision about the particular markets to export and about the strate-
gic bids to offer in auction for electricity transmission lines) and reserves si
3 for the
twelve monthly contracting. The yearly contracts are made in these eight markets and
the similar process is repeated twelve times to make the monthly contracts. Buyers
strategically decides about the splitting their demand between the yearly, monthly con-
tracts and various electricity producers to achieve the best prices. The cellModel again
implements all the activities regarding the processing the particular proﬁle s.
This paper does not study a particular model, it describes some of the methods
developedtogetherwithourmodels. DetaildescriptionofMCE(orothermodel)would
be a topic for another large paper.
4.2 Top-level of computation
Computing the prediction of players’ behavior in a given game is well scalable by
speciﬁcation of its state space. The computation is very dependent on the particular
application, especially on its internal model of behavior which we call cellModel here.
We proceed the practical experiments using a machine having 8xCPUs Xeon 2.66 GHz
and 16 GB of the RAM memory (or alternatively on 4xCPUs AMD Opteron 2.8GHz
with 32 GB RAM). The computation may take minutes, hours or the time exceeding
our requirements.
The general structure of the whole experiments passes two basic phases (see Fi-
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gure 2). The initial game state space (Original game) has obviously a plenty of redun-
dant dominated strategies which the rational player is never going to play. The state
space has an extreme cardinality. This is the task which the experimenter formulated
for the simulation. Usually, it contains all possible and hypothetical strategies to ensure
that no behavior was forgot. It is not possible to analyze the state space in this form
(see section 2.3 for a brief demonstration of the algorithmic complexity). A reduction
mechanism is invoked to predict subsets of good strategies (for example there might
be tens of them for each player).
The equilibrium solver is then responsible for determination of the equilibria. In
this two-level game modeling, the expert core (cellModel) and the rather general ex-
perimenting mechanism (reduction mechanism, equilibrium solver mechanism) are
separated. Let us conclude the overall motivation for this approach:
(i) We have to construct a practical computer model capable of certain analysis and
prediction.
(ii) The model must be enormously ﬂexible and ready to accept any modiﬁcation of
its structure, speciﬁcation and mission.
(iii) The experimenter may not be limited in specifying his queries (state spaces).
(iv) Model execution must be maximally efﬁcient and fast responding. We assume
the experimenter doing large batches of experiments.
(v) The model (and the simulation method) must be ready for parallel processing.
The following two sections give some response to these requirements.
5. Computing the correlated equilibria
Correlated equilibrium (CE) (Aumann 1974, Papadimitriou 2005) is a well know game
theoretic concept extending the classical Nash equilibrium with a special synchroniza-
tion device helping the players to make their decision. A rational player then agree
that incoming event (signal) recommends him the best strategy do choose. This is an
opposite to the Nash equilibrium (NE), which assumes no communication platform
between players and their surrounding environment. The players then prefer to make
careful actions, often leading to lower common social outcome and misunderstandings.
Following our experience and results, we do believe that a rational player in market
competition (where the rationality is a common knowledge) behaves in the manner of
correlated equilibrium. More reasoning for the use of the correlated equilibria has been
done in Samuelson (2004).
Correlated equilibrium is computable in polynomial time (Papadimitriou 2005) as
a linear programming (LP) task maximizing the common outcome of all players in
context of game constraints. Unfortunately, in our practical games with large number
of players and their strategies, the task is still too huge to be solvable on standard PC
computers. On the other hand, most of the games coming from real situations can
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be converted to their minimized strategic equivalents (where dominated strategies are
eliminated) which are computable in a fraction of the original computing time. And
we would like to algorithmize this transformation.
Let us assume a previously deﬁned N-player game G with already computed stra-
tegy state space S, so that all Ui are known for all i ∈ Q and s ∈ S. Let us assume
that all strategy proﬁles are ordered (s1,s2,...,s|S|) and can be indexed by an inte-
ger j ∈ {1,...,|S|}. By computing the correlated equilibria we obtain a row vector
p = (p1,p2,...,p|S|) of probabilities assigned to all strategy proﬁles (we also say, a
probability distribution on strategy space). CE is a form of Nash equilibria in mixed
strategies(MNE)andsimilarlylikeinNashequilibria, morethanoneequilibriumpoint
can satisfy deﬁnition of CE. Regarding the presumption of rationality among players
we search for a unique Pareto efﬁcient CE. The following technique gives a proﬁle
with maximum payoff for all players where no one wants to deviate.
5.1 Basic approach
Correlated equilibrium is computable as a linear programming (LP) problem where we
maximize the global objective function Z in (6) with probability variables pj satisfying
(7) to obtain the best solution for all players together (Pareto optimal solution). The










pj = 1 (7)
GpT ≥ 0 (8)
The (8) is a set of linear inequalities with G as a matrix of coefﬁcients. G-matrix
completely describes all possible actions of the players and their consequences. Algo-
rithm to compute G-matrix will be described bellow. Zj in (9) denotes one complex






There are generally three approaches to that: wi = 1, wi = 1
N, wi are different to
each player (for example to normalize them if they are not similarly strong). These
weights are for everyone to tune for his own particular application. There is absolutely
no general recommendation for that.
Solving the LP-problem, we obtain an optimal point (p1,...,p|S|), Z contains a
(Pareto) optimal outcome for all players which is the highest possible and no player
wishes to deviate. The vector (p1,p2,...,p|S|) is the wanted correlated equilibrium.
Anyway, there is a strong inﬂuence of the linear constraints deﬁning what strategies
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will each player never play. The LP-solver constructs a problem domain deﬁned by
given inequalities modelling the basic Nash rule of equilibria (G-matrix) – the i-th
player will not change his strategy j to k in s∗ proﬁle if he will not get betterUi(k,s∗
−i)
thanUi(j,s∗
−i). And ﬁnally, the LP-solver will ﬁnd the best proﬁle with this constraint.
Computing the G-matrix
G-matrix collects all relative preferences of players in G game regarding their strategies
and can be constructed by following rules:
(i) Rows of G-matrix are indexed ijk where i indexes a player, j his strategy and
k his alternative strategy. The i-th player evaluates how his proﬁt is going to
change if he moves from j strategy to k strategy. There are å
N
i=1|Si|.(|Si|−1) of
rows in the G-matrix.
(ii) Columns of G are particular strategy proﬁles s ∈ S of the G game. There are
PN
i=1|Si| of columns.
(iii) Cell gijk,s in the G−matrix at ijk row and column s ∈ S:
gijk,s =
(
Ui(s)−Ui((k,s−i)) si = j
0 otherwise
(10)
The G-matrix is a very simple structure (2D matrix) appropriate for further game-
theoretic analysis of strategy space. The multi-dimensional problem is transformed
into a 2D matrix. It simpliﬁes the following analysis.
5.2 An example of solving a game
Let us have a two player game G = ({1,2};{a,b},{c,d};U1,U2) with payoffs written
in Figure 3. The G-matrix for this game is computed in Figure 4 with proﬁles ordering
(ac,ad,bc,bd). This system will generate a following LP problem:
MAXIMISE : Z = 12p1+12p2+9p3+10p4 (11)




pi = 1 (13)
5p1+ p2 ≥ 0 (14)
−5p3− p4 ≥ 0 (15)
−2p1+ p3 ≥ 0 (16)
2p2− p4 ≥ 0 (17)
The Nash equilibrium is clearly ad. From (15) we see that p3,4 =0, then from (16) that
p1 = 0 and so, (14) together with (13) gives p2 = 1. We interpret the result (0,1,0,0)
that the proﬁle ad wins with probability 100%.
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Figure 4. G-Matrix in the example
ac ad bc bd
a → b 5 1
b → a −5 −1
c → d −2 1
d → c 2 −1
5.3 Iterative elimination of dominated strategies
We have implemented a linear programming solver of correlated equilibrium using
GLPK library (GLPK homepage 2008, GNU Linear Programming Kit). Solving CE
has theoretically always a solution as it is just another view to Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies (Nash 1951). Moreover, solving this problem has a polynomial time
complexity (Papadimitriou 2005). However, for a very large game, the computation
takes too much time or computer memory. The LP-solver can get lost in some nu-
merical instability too. Thus, getting a proper solution is not absolutely guaranteed in
practice. This trouble can be cured by reducing the game to its smaller equivalent, as
we will see now.
Iterative elimination through the G-matrix
We are going to explain this approach using the previous example (Figure 3). Let
us examine the Figure 4. The ﬁrst row shows that all payoffs are positive. It means
that the row-player has his payoffs always higher when playing a-strategy rather then
b-strategy. The rows with zero elements are redundant as they have no effect to the
LP-problem solving.
The second row is more interesting, because all differences are negative (we do not
care about the zero elements). It indicates that the utility when playing b-strategy is
always worse then when playing a-strategy, thus a strongly dominates the b-strategy.
No matter, if b is dominated by all other strategies of row player, to satisfy the con-
straints (12) and (15), probabilities assigned to bc and bd proﬁles must be zero, so
p3 = p4 = 0. The negative row and corresponding columns, i.e. the LP variables, p3
and p4 are removed then.
The process may continue until the G-matrix is minimized, it means without nega-
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tive rows (see Figure 5). In some cases, this elimination may lead to a single-proﬁle
state. Otherwise, we normally apply the LP-solver to the reduced game speciﬁcation, it
means to the reduced set of proﬁles (probability variables) and corresponding strategy
sets.
Figure 5. Elimination steps
ab ad
a → b 5 1
c → d −2
d → c 2
⇒
ad
a → b 1
d → c 2
5.4 G-solve: An efﬁcient algorithm for solving the correlated equilibria
Having this elimination procedure we may turn the order of computing activities from
the former sequence of (i) computing the state space, (ii) eliminating dominated strate-
gies, and (iii) equilibria computing to a new optimized algorithm where computing the
state space is being done on-the-ﬂy as a sub-part of the elimination procedure.
By our experience, the G-solve terminates in shorter time than the classical app-
roach (unfortunately, it has not been studied deeply at a theoretical level) and it is
signiﬁcantly less memory consuming.2 Let us deﬁne following data structures and
data types:
(i) valid : S → Boolean is a Boolean array displaying what proﬁles are valid or
non-valid (zero/non-zero probability). Initially, all proﬁles are valid.
(ii) umap:S →RN is a dynamic dictionary (items can be added and removed during
the computation) assigning payoff vectors to particular proﬁles. Initially, umap
is empty.
(iii) dominated : Q×Si → Boolean is a boolean array displaying what strategies are
already found to be dominated. Initially, all are set False.
(iv) type profList is a list of tuples (S,R).
(v) type gRow = (pos : profList,neg : profList)
(vi) G[i, j,k] is a dynamic list of gRow indexed by (i, j,k). G represents the G-matrix.
The G-solve algorithm (Algorithm 3) is started and goes through all players of
the G game and all variants of their behavior. The whole algorithm is split into parts,
Algorithm 3, 5, 6 and 7 (see the Appendix), to make it easier to study. At the end,
remaining G list and valid array contain the resulting minimized game Gr.
2 The algorithm has been developed and tested on PC with 8xCPU Xeon 2.66GHz and 16 GB RAM.
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Algorithm 3 G-solve – main part
for i in Q:
for j in S[i]:
for k in S[i]:
if (j!=k):
if (not(dominated[i][j] or dominated[i][k])):
row = solveRow(i,j,k);
if (row != ([],[])):




for (s,r) in row.neg:
disableProf(i,s);
Let Gr = (Q;Sr1,...,SrN;Ur1,...,Ur2) is the minimized game Gr. Strategy sets are
reduced to Sri in (18) and only the utility functions (19) are selected to the new game.
Sri = {si|s ∈ S∧valid[s]} (18)
Uri(s) =Ui(s);∀s ∈ Sr (19)
The G-solve elimination may terminate in state when Sr = {s∗}. In that case, s∗ is
the equilibrium (in strictly dominant strategies). Otherwise, if |Sri|>1 for some player
i ∈ Q, the CE-solver can be applied to the resulting Gr game. The G-matrix for Gr is
already completed in G[i, j,k], just some mapping from G state space to Gr state space
has to be speciﬁed.
5.5 Meaning of this method
G-solve is an exact method of efﬁcient computing the correlated equilibria in multi-
player games. The method combines the computing of the game optimum together
with computing the utility functions. In this way, only the relevant cells of state space
are analyzed. It is a type of a heuristics which does not effect the cellModel and
reduces the number of cells searched during the game analysis.
When comparing the time and memory complexity of computing CE without G-
solve and with G-solve approach, we can see that complexity without G-solve deﬁnes
the worst case complexity for the approach with G-solve enabled. The ﬁnal complexity
of the equilibrium determination may be improved depending on particular game and
formulation of the internal model cellModel. This is very application speciﬁc.
The G-aolve method is suitable for computing the CE in relatively small games
where the size of state space does not exceed 108 −1010 cells. The method can be
used as a terminating operation after another mechanism of state space reduction (for
example FDDS in the following section).
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Table 1. Demonstration of computing speed-up with G-solve enabled
Experiment





n1 11,520 0.305 s 1.084 s
n2 155,520 5.9 s 14.8 s
n3 5,054,400 4 min 51 s 16 min 12 s
n4 15,300,000 13 min 54 s memory shortage
As a demonstration of the method in operation, we provide a small experiment
(Table 1). The cases (games) were generated out of our MCE model (see section 4.1).
From the equilibrium determination point of view, just the number of strategic proﬁles
is relevant. The part solving the correlated equilibria was executed as an independent
program where its execution time is measured. The experiment was done on PC with
4xCPU AMD Opteron 2.8GHz and 32 GB RAM. We show the execution times with
G-Solve operational and without G-Solve – the program builds the whole G-matrix
with no reductions (see section 5.1).
We can see that the processing time with G-solve enabled is always about 3-4
times shorter. The last experiment n4 without G-solve did not terminate correctly as
the memory requirements exceeded the computer’s capacity (32 GB RAM).
Unfortunately, we are not able to compare our implementation of the correlated
equilibrium solver (with or without the G-Solver reduction mechanism) with another
computer implementation of such a solver. To our best knowledge, there is no pub-
lished paper on technical details of this problem or a computer tool solving that.
6. Fast Detection of Dominant Strategies (FDDS)
Analyzing the strategy dominance was the starting idea of this method again. We
expect the input state space S to be entered extremely wide (|S| ' 1030 is often in our
models) and that S will get signiﬁcantly reduced. We assume that existence of strict
dominance for some players is probable as well. When doing the practical experiments
in multi-dimensional decision modeling (see (5)), it is not rare that a certain subpart
of the decision variables Di,dom ⊆ Di of a player i demonstrates a strictly dominant
behavior. In such a case, the player makes his decision de facto just in Di\Di,dom. For
example, someplayersaresurethattheymakebetterwhensellingtheirtotalproduction
to the domestic buyer rather then exporting that (then the sub-decisions ”sell maximum
home” strictly dominates ”sell a part home and export the rest”).
Let us assume the distinguishability of the players’ strategies. The player i then
exactly knows in any proﬁle s ∈ S if he wants to change his strategy si (if si / ∈ BR(s−i))
or not. If BRi(s−i) = {s0
i}, then the player i exactly knows the strategy s0
i to move into.
Otherwise he decides one of BRi(s−i).
The following algorithm (FDDS) allows various forms of outputs including the fast
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 2, no. 3 293M. Hrub´ y
detection of dominant strategies, pure Nash equilibria, or detection of certain cycles
demonstrating the mixed behavior (sources of mixed Nash equilibria). So called Graph
of Reachable Proﬁles (GRP) is constructed during FDDS operation. Solution to the
games comes out from the GRP analysis.
It is very important to emphasize at the very beginning, that determining the game
equilibria is not the primarily goal of FDDS. The goal is to make a very fast and
representative preview at the important strategies of the players. FDDS is a simulation
method and hence its quality strongly depends on efforts to experiment with the model.
There is deﬁnitely no absolute guarantee that the FDDS algorithm reducing the input
game G to Gr transforms the input to its strategically equivalent game Gr. Proving that
is currently not possible neither analytically nor experimentally (it might be possible
for small games as a case veriﬁcation). We are pretty sure that the behavior in Gr is
not signiﬁcantly far from G. It is the best available solution to the large games at the
moment, and rather satisfactory for our applications.
Deﬁnition 7. Graph of Reachable Proﬁles of a given game G = (Q;S;U) is a structure
GRP = [V,E], where
(i) V is a (ﬁnite) set of nodes (s,Qa,Qr), where s ∈ S; Qa,Qr ⊆ Q;Qa ∩Qr = / 0.
Qr is a subset of players who agree with the proﬁle s. Similarly, Qr are those
who does not agree with s. Only players i having si ∈ BRi(s−i) do agree with the
proﬁle s.
(ii) E ⊆V ×V ×Q is a set of edges. Edges are relevant just for analyzing the graph
topology (cycles, trees). The edges are restricted just for non-agreeing players,
thus ∀(v1,v2,i) ∈ E,v1 = (s,Qa,Qr) : i ∈ Qr. The edge expresses the i-th player
deviation from the v1 node to the proﬁle corresponding to the node v2.
In the following text, we demonstrate the algorithm of computing the GRP for a given
game and we introduce its analysis.
6.1 Analysis of GRP
Let us have a graph of reachable proﬁles GRP = [V,E] of a given game G = (Q;S;U).
The set of proﬁles in (20) is called the set of reachable proﬁles. A node v ∈V is called
to be solved if Qa ∪Qr = Q. The node v ∈ V is a pure Nash equilibrium if Qa = Q
(i.e. Qr = / 0).
Sres = {s|(s,qa,qr) ∈V} (20)
If the GRP is topologically a tree and all its nodes are solved, the related game
G has a solution in form of pure Nash equilibria. If the number of PNEs is greater
then one, we shall compute their MNE complements using some other mathematical
methods.
Studying cycles (or clusters of cycles) in GRPs is more difﬁcult and it exceeds the
range of this paper. We believe that their analysis can lead towards fast computation
of mixed equilibria. Generally, a cycle in graph is a closed path with no other repeated
node than the starting (ending) one. In the meaning of strategic behavior, a player i in a
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proﬁles0 doesnotagreewiththeproﬁleandchoosesanotherproﬁles1 =(BRi(s0),s0
−i).
The next player j then continues to s2 and so on until the starting player i moves back
into s0 again.
In the current state, there is no proper experimental and theoretical conclusion
about logic connection between cycles and equilibria. The reduced game Gr is thus
deﬁned as a game within the set of reachable proﬁles Sres in (20) of G. So, Gr is deﬁned
as follows:
Gr = (Q;Sr;Ur);Sr,i = {si|s ∈ Sres} (21)
WecomputetheequilibriabasedonGrusingconventionalmethods(forexampleG-solve).
6.2 Algorithm of GRP construction
A potential dominant strategy si of a player i will become evident in any strategic
proﬁle s. Thus, we may start with any randomly chosen proﬁles s0 ∈ S in our analysis.
We study, if the player i would deviate in s0 proﬁle. The set of strategies given in (22)
is a set of potential deviations of the player i.
Bi(s0) = {b ∈ Si|Ui(b,s0
−i) ≥Ui(s0)} (22)
Clearly, BRi(s0)⊆Bi(s0). The player i will react in the proﬁle s0 moving into some
b ∈ BRi(s0). If |BRi(s0)| > 1 holds, we have to analyze concurrently more similar
options of the player (branching). As it was mentioned many time before, it is highly
preferable if the strategies are well distinguishable and such a state does not appear.
Inserting a node to the GRP structure
This procedure (see Algorithm 4) adds to GRP = [V,E] all best-response strategies B
of the player i playing from the current node v = (s,Qa,Qr).
Algorithm 4 Inserting new nodes (B,v,GRP)
for b in B:
if si = b then add i to Qa,
else:
add i to Qr
if exists v0 = (s0,Q0
a,Q0
r) inV that (b,s−i) = s0:
add i to Q0
a
else:
add a new v0 = ((b,s−i),{i}, / 0) to V
add a new edge (v,v0,i) to E
Main algorithm of GRP construction
The top view on the algorithm is as follows:
(i) Initialize the GRP = [V0, / 0] with randomly generated nodes. If Srand ⊂ S is a set
of random proﬁles, the initial set of nodes isV0 = {(s, / 0, / 0)|s ∈ Srand}.
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(ii) Select randomly a node v = (s,Qa,Qr) from V which is not solved yet. If there
is no such a node left, terminate the algorithm.
(iii) Compute B := BRi(s) using the Algorithm 1. Let i is a player randomly chosen
in v from Q\(Qa∪Qr). We would like to remind that this operation requires to
invoke the cellModel(s,C) for all s ∈ {(si,s−i)|si ∈ Si}. It means, |Si| times.
(iv) Insert all B chosen by the player i coming from v to the GRP structure (Algo-
rithm 4).
(v) Go to step 2.
The algorithm terminates if all nodes of its GRP being constructed are solved, or if
the number of nodes is equal to the cardinality of the set of all strategic proﬁles (the
state space). Termination of the algorithm is thus guarantied (the computability). If
we study this case in point of view of the algorithmic (time) complexity, the algorithm
does not always terminates practically because the size of S may be huge.
The practical experiments conclude that expressing some explicit termination con-
dition may have its reasons. There are two possible conditions for enforcing the algo-
rithm to halt:
(i) |V| exceeds a given limit,
(ii) age of GRP exceeds a given limit. Age of GRP is a length of uninterrupted
sequence of the main algorithm iterating with no new node added to V.
The FDDS algorithm can be also scalable by number of initial randomly generated
nodes. The practical experiments demonstrate that even one initial node can cause a
large spread over the game state space. The algorithm is ready for parallel processing,
so that the steps (ii)-(v) are done in parallel.
6.3 Meaning of the FDDS algorithm
Thealgorithmissuitableforaveryfastanalysisofagamestatespace, andfordetection
of good strategies given in (1). The FDDS algorithm is scalable. The computation
complexity can be regulated by number of initial nodes, number of maximal nodes in
the graph and number of steps with the graph unchanged.
A reduced game Gr is the output from the FDDS algorithm. Probability of strategic
equivalence (see section 2.2) between Gr and the original G grows with the effort of ex-
perimenting. Let us emphasize once more that the quality of the output is signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by the strategy distinguishability. If the state space is well distinguishable
as deﬁned in (4), the FDDS analysis converges quickly.
7. Conclusion
The paper presented the methodology and algorithms which we are currently using in
the design and development of computer models of commodity markets. The models
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are intended for analysis of the markets and for forecasting of their further evolution in
horizons of 1–15 years. There is surely a plenty of similar modeling techniques related
to this research area. We have focused mostly to a very narrow part of them, speciﬁ-
cally to the methods of state space reduction. The paper does not analyze a particular
model or a case study. It is rather a general description of architecture of these models.
Anyone should be able to build his own model following this methodology.
The models are conceived as a tool for massive experimenting. An user-experimen-
ter works with them in the simulation manner, i.e. speciﬁes his queries and obtains a
new knowledge of the modeled system. Allowing the user to enter the experimental
domain (strategy sets) as wide as possible was the very required feature of these mo-
dels. A limited state space S may cause that some reasonable variant of the behavior is
neglected. The experiment thus fails or ends up with wrong results.
When implementing the reduction techniques, we have to keep in mind the ques-
tion, if the reduced and original game are strategically equivalent, i.e. that all strate-
gically important strategies of the original game are included in the reduced game as
well. We presented two methods: it is clear that the strategic equivalence is not dama-
ged in G-solve method (in the meaning of correlated equilibria). This correspondence
may be corrupted by the FDDS method, or to be more precise, the probability of non-
correspondence gets close to zero as we spent the time in experimenting. The quality
of the whole process is highly inﬂuenced by the proper design of cellModel. Every
small detail of the player’s strategy and the current context must be included in the
computing of the player’s payoff. It makes the differentiation between the strategies
easier.
We presented a very wide framework of all actions heading towards the imple-
mentation of an operating game theoretical computer model. Some of the details were
probably not discussed properly. However, the framework itself is a mosaic where any
its internal component may be substituted by another one. For example, the equilib-
rium solver (Figure 2) can be concretized with an implementation of Nash-equilibrium
solver, or correlated equilibrium solver (G-solve), or Stackelberg-equilibrium, or any
user-speciﬁc way of predicting the players’ behavior. The paper comes from the Com-
puter science background and its main contribution stays in making the sophisticated
algorithms of large problems and their use in computer simulations.
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Appendix. G-solve code
Algorithm 5 G-solve – solveRow(i,j,k)
pos := []; neg := [];
for s in S: # run this in parallel
if (s[i]==j and valid[s]):




if (uj != Nil and uk != Nil):
diff := uj - uk;
if (diff != 0):
if (diff>0):
pos.append( (s, diff) );
else:
neg.append( (s, diff) );
return (pos, neg);
Algorithm 6 G-solve – getU(s,i)
if (umap[s]==Nil):
# this is the main computation load
umap[s] := cellModel(s, C);
return umap[s][i];
Algorithm 7 G-solve – disableProf(it,s)
valid[s] := False
umap[s] := Nil # free the umap item
for i in [1,...,it]:
for j in S[i]:




if (row.pos == []):
for (s2,r) in row.neg:
disableProf(it, s2)
G[i,j,k] := Nil
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